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Summary findings
Pension reforms normally focus on the accumulation  saving (not served by most annuity products),  distrust of
phase, plus term insurance that provides benefits for the  insurance companies (and unwillingness to turn sizeable
disabled and for dependent survivors, all of which are  savings over to them), adverse selection, and the
immediate concerns. Decumulation of the capital in  crowding-out effect of social security (which
workers'  retirement savings accounts appears to be far in  automatically annuitizes the largest share of people's
the future. But in the second generation of reforms,  retirement wealth).
countries have begun paying attention to eventual  Preliminary findings suggest that the cost of annuities
decumulation-either  through gradual withdrawals or  is lower than might be expected. When the risk-free
through annuitization, which provides longevity  discount rate is used, the money's -worth ratios of
insurance. At this point it becomes important  ro learn  nominal annuities based on annuitant  mortality tables
whether annuity markets exist and how they operate.  exceed 97 percent (in some cases they are over 100
James and Vittas summarize preliminary results of a  percent). Even when population mortality tables are
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Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. They focus on  large as anticipated.
understanding whether annuity markets can be relied  But real annuities (in Chile, Israel, and the United
upon to provide reliable retirement  income at reasonable  Kingdom) have money's-worth ratios 7 to 9 percent
prices.  lower than those of nominal annuities. And when the
One way to approach this question is to explore  "riskier" corporate bond rate is used for discounting
whether the expected payouts and the "money's-worth  purposes, there is a further 7 percent reduction.
ratio"  differ across countries, and if so, why, and what  The main policy issues include public versus private
light can be thrown on the existence and amount of  provision, the role of insurance companies in term and
adverse selection.  risk intermediation,  the level of compulsory
Annuity markets are poorly developed for various  annuitization, and the need for robust regulation of
reasons: worker myopia, precautionary and bequest  annuity providers.
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Pension  reforms normally  focus on the accumulation  phase, plus term insurance
that provides benefits for the disabled and for dependent  survivors, all of which are
immediate concerns.' Decumulation of  the  capital in  workers'  retirement savings
accounts  appears to be far off in the future. But in the second generation of reforms,
countries  have begun to pay attention  to eventual  decumulation,  either through gradual
withdrawals  or through  annuitization  which  provides  longevity  insurance.  At this point, it
becomes  important  to learn  whether  annuity  markets  exist and how  they operate.
We have undertaken  a project  that attempts  to analyze  annuity  markets around  the
world. We are particularly interested  in understanding  whether these markets can be
relied on to provide reliable retirement  income at reasonable  prices and what kinds of
market failure can be anticipated.  One way to  approach  this question is to  explore
whether  the expected  pay-outs  and  the "money's worth ratio" differ across  countries,  if so
why and what light we could throw on the existence  and size of adverse  selection.  In this
paper we present  some  preliminary  results. 2
In  our project we included studies of  annuity markets in  Canada, the UK,
Switzerland,  Australia,  Israel, Chile and Singapore-a variety  of high and middle  income
countries. 3 Not surprisingly,  annuity markets  are poorly developed  in these countries, as
elsewhere. This phenomenon  may be due to a variety of reasons: worker myopia, the
precautionary  and bequest motives for saving which are not served by most annuity
products, a general distrust of insurance  companies  and unwillingness  to turn over to
them a large accumulation  of savings,  adverse  selection,  and a crowd-out  effect  by social
security,  which automatically  annuitizes  the largest share of peoples' retirement  wealth
(James and Vittas 1999, Vittas and Skully 1991). But annuity markets are growing
1  For a discussion  of how countries  have dealt with disability  and survivors  insurance  see James  and Vittas
1999.
2 The numbers  we present  should  not be quoted  because  they  will probably  be further  refined and modified.
However,  we expect  that the general  tendencies  will remain.  Numbers on Singapore  will be added later.
Preliminary  results  indicate  that  their payouts  and  money's worth  ratios are very  high.
3 The country studies  were done by David Knox-Australia,  Hyan Tae Kim and Keith P. Sharp-Canada,
Jonathan Callund-Chile,  Avia Spivak-Israel,  Chiu-Cheng  Chan-Singapore,  Michael Breuer and Peter
Zweifel-Switzerland  and Mamta  Murthi,  J. Michael  Orszag  and Peter  Orszag-U.K.rapidly in some cases, such as the UK, Australia, Chile and Singapore, that have decided
to rely on mandatory retirement savings accounts to provide security in old age.
The underdevelopment of the industry manifests itself in many ways: its small
size relative to  other kinds of insurance, the absence of mortality tables  which  are a
prerequisite to  sound pricing  and  funding policies,  and the  relative  paucity  in  most
countries of long term financial instruments with which to match assets and  liabilities,
thereby creating substantial reinvestment risk. One might expect, in view of these signs
of an undeveloped industry, that it would not provide good service to consumers and its
"money's  worth ratio," the present value of the expected stream of benefits divided by its
initial cost, would be low. We might also expect to find substantial adverse selection, as
only small proportions of the population are in the market. However, we find just  the
opposite.
A money's  worth ratio (MWR) of 1 indicates that the consumer is getting back, in
present expected value, exactly what he put in. This would be surprising, in view of the
fact that the annuity company is incurring some administrative expenses and is providing
investment and  longevity  insurance, which are not  cost-free. Normally,  therefore,  we
would expect the MWR for people who purchase annuities to be  less than  100%. We
would also expect a substantially lower ratio for the average member of the population,
most of whom have decided not to purchase annuities. What did we find?
When using the risk-free discount rate, MWR's  of nominal  annuities based  on
annuitant mortality tables exceed 97% (in some cases they are over  100%)  and  even
when using population mortality tables they exceed 90%--neither the industry "take" nor
the  effects  of  adverse  selection appear  to  be  as  large  as  anticipated.  However,  real
annuities (in Chile, Israel and the UK) have MWR's that are 7-9% lower than those  of
nominal annuities. And when we use a higher "risky" discount rate, we get another 7%
reduction.
Where do the companies get the money to cover their expenses, including sales
commissions that are reputed to be high, given these seemingly high pay-outs? Why do
real annuities appear to be a "worse deal" for consumers than nominal annuities? And
which is the correct discount rate? We believe that the answer to all three questions lies in
the nature of the insurance company as a institution for term and risk intermediation.
2Insurance companies take the premiums that people pay when purchasing an
annuity and invest the money  at rates that include  a long term premium,  a risk premium
and  an equity premium (in corporate bonds, equities, real estate as  well as  some
government  bonds)-then  turn these long term medium  risk investments  into a risk-free
annuity which is sold at a price that is actuarially  fair at government  bond rates, for a
mixture  of short and long term pay-outs.  The company  covers its costs and earns a profit
on the investment  spread. Later,  we discuss  the issue of whether  annuities  really are risk-
free and whether consumers  really want a risk-free annuity (as opposed to a riskier
annuity that pays a higher return). The question of whether people get their money's
worth depends in large part on how efficiently  insurance companies  perform this term
and risk intermediation  function  and whether  people  want them  to perform  it.
Part I of this paper  presents  some  background  information  about  the growth of the
annuity  industry  under new multi-pillar  systems.  Part II describes  our data, methodology
and  results with  respect to  the money's  worth analysis. Part  III  discusses policy
implications, including the  cost-effectiveness  of  public versus private provision of
annuities, how to  provide inflation insurance, and whether adverse selection makes
compulsory  annuitization  desirable.
1. The Annuity Industry
The annuity industry is minuscule in most countries. But in countries that have
instituted  mandatory  retirement  savings plans,  it is  growing  rapidly.  Typically  these
countries constrain the kinds of pay-outs that people can choose upon retirement, making
annuities one of a very limited set of choices.
For  example,  the  Australian  annuity  business is  developing  only  now,  as  a
consequence of its new superannuation scheme, which requires workers to accumulate
large retirement savings that they can then use either in gradual withdrawals or in annuity
purchases.  In Australia in  1994, when this scheme started, assets backing life annuities
were only A$1.3 billion or 4% of non-superannuation assets in life insurance companies,
whereas by 1998 they were $3 billion, over 10% of non-super life insurance assets.
3In Chile there was no annuity business  prior to the new AFP system,  but that has
changed drastically.  Currently,  when workers retire in Chile they are required either to
leave their money in their AFP for programmed  withdrawals,  to take an immediate
annuity, or  to  purchase a  deferred annuity with  programmed withdrawals in  the
meantime.  Keeping  money in the AFP allows it to earn a risk premium but the annuity
option provides investment  and longevity  insurance.  Annuities  have other advantages:  if
a worker has enough savings to purchase an annuity that exceeds 50% of his average
wage over the last 10 years, he can "retire" early and stop contributing  to the mandatory
system, while continuing  to work. If the annuity exceeds 70% of his average  wage, the
rest can be taken out as a lump sum-he  can get immediate access to his retirement
savings. Insurance companies  can buy the workers' "bono" (a compensation  bond for
work under the previous system)  at a discount, thereby  helping him to retire early. As a
result of these incentives, the annuity business has grown dramatically in  Chile. Its
reserves  have risen from US$1.5  billion  in 1988  to $7.7 billion in 1998  and are expected
to reach $37  billion in 2010. Annuities,  especially  early retirement  annuities,  are now 2/3
of total life insurance  sales.
Likewise,  Singapore's annuity  market started  in 1987  when annuities  became  one
of the  allowable options for the  retirement savings that workers were required to
accumulate  in their retirement  savings  accounts  (the Minimum  Sum Scheme).  At the age
of 55 workers  must set aside $55,000  (now $60,000)  to buy a deferred annuity,  to deposit
with a bank or to leave with the Central Provident  Fund (CPF). If they buy an annuity
they acquire longevity and investment  insurance that they would not have otherwise.
Additionally,  insurance  companies  have tried to offer consumers  a better initial rate than
they could get under the other options,  which pay low interest rates. As a result of this
Scheme,  the annuity  business  is growing  rapidly  in Singapore  and new annuity  premiums
are now 15%  of total new insurance  business.
The industry appears to start out concentrated,  gradually grow less concentrated
as its expands  in size, and is international  in scope.  In 1988  the life insurance  industry  in
Chile (mostly  annuities)  consisted  of 9 companies,  of which the top one had 47% of the
market and the top three had 87%. By 1998 there were 23 companies,  the largest one
4having only an 11% market share and the top three 30%. All except four are foreign
owned  or joint ventures,  and seven  have  close ties with specific  AFPs.
II.  Do Consumers  Get A Good  Deal?-the  Money's  Worth  Ratio
Do these annuity  companies  provide  good value for money? Are private annuities
a good way to provide  old age security?  We proceed now to analyze empirical  evidence
that bears on this issue. We assembled  a team of economists  and actuaries from seven
countries  and asked  them to analyze  the annuity  markets  in their countries.  We also asked
them to  calculate the  MWR for several annuity products. We  followed the  same
procedure  for measuring  the MWR  that was followed  in Friedman  and Warshawsky  1990
as modified  by Mitchell  et al 1997  and Brown  et al 1999,  three of the seminal  papers on
this topic. This procedure  was described  in a manual that was prepared by Brown and
shared  with all team members.
The original  Warshawsky,  Brown and Mitchell  papers were written about the US
and UK. So it is not surprising  that when we tried to apply it to other countries  where
financial markets were less developed,  implementation  problems soon developed. The
main issues concerned  the relevant  interest  rate and mortality  tables.
Data and methodology
Mortality  tables.  Since annuitants  collect  benefits as long as they will live, we
need to know what the probabilities  are of life and death for each remaining year to
ascertain the expected present value of the benefit stream. Cohort mortality tables are
needed  for this purpose.  Such a table shows,  for a given  cohort such as all those who are
65 year old today, year-by-year  survival  probabilities.  Because  of improvements  in health
and medical technology,  these probabilities  will be higher for people who are currently
50 years old, and even higher  for their children.
To develop a cohort mortality  table, we might start out with a period table that
gives current age-specific mortality rates on a cross-sectional  basis, but a longevity
improvement  factor  must be built in to turn it into a cohort life table. When projecting  the
5pricing and funding policies of a company, or when consumers are deciding what is the
expected value of an annuity to them, it is important to have such a table.
In  addition  to  the  need to  project  longevity  improvements-which  is  always
difficult-account  must be taken of the differences between the group of annuitants and
the population at large. Often, only population-wide data are available, but we really want
to know about the annuitant group, whose mortality rates may be lower than average (see
discussion  of adverse  selection below).  However, especially  in the  early years  of  an
annuity market, such data may simply not be available. That is exactly what we found.
Of all  the countries  in  our sample, the UK  has  the most  developed  financial
market and annuities-pension industry. The UK has long offered occupational pensions
but only recently began offering personal pensions. As might be expected, it has collected
considerable data on mortality of occupational pensioners, but until this year did not have
data on retirees with personal pensions. A new table indicate that this  group, too, may
have greater longevity than predicted and therefore our MWR's  may be understated by
the occupational data that we used.
The lack of a previous life or annuity business means that no annuitants'  mortality
table has been developed in Australia; instead they use a table based on UK annuitants in
1980, with an allowance for mortality improvements. Our calculations (as well as rules of
Australian regulators) assume that the current cohort of retirees in Australia will have a
mortality rate 60% that of the 1980 table.  This seems to fit recent Australian experience
with males but may understate the longevity and therefore the MWR of females.
In Singapore too, companies have little data on which to base their pricing. They
also use UK data, this time from 1967-70, with mortality improvements projected to 1990
and with a two year setback to account for future mortality improvements (a very crude
adjustment factor). The scanty evidence available thus far suggests that actual deaths are
far less than expected.
In Israel we used data collected by a single large pension fund, supplemented by
new  actuarial tables  that are about to  come into use. Insurance companies  have been
using UK  life tables-these  are obviously serving as a public good around the world.
Israel has no carefully developed cohort life tables of its own. In Switzerland the first
population cohort tables were published in  1998 and no annuitants'  tables are publicly
6available. Our team was granted confidential use of the tables of the Swiss Life Insurance
Association for the MW calculations. Only now is Chile developing and up-dating  its
annuitant and population mortality tables.
Even in the presence of public accurate mortality information, it is difficult to
know how to value annuities because future life expectancy remains an unknown. When
public accurate information is unavailable, the task becomes much more difficult. It  is
probable  that  lacking  this  information, people  consistently  underestimate  their  life
expectancy, basing their guesses upon the death rates of people around them now, rather
than what is likely to happen in the future. That could be one reason for the low voluntary
purchase of annuities, in unconstrained situations. It is also possible that the tables we
have  used  underestimate  future increases in  life  expectancy and  therefore  the  MWR
received  by  the average  annuitant 4. If  so, this  will  also  mean that  future costs  and
obligations of insurance companies will be higher than they expect.
Interest rates.  Ideally, the term  structure of interest rates  should be  used to
discount future annuity payments, and these were available for long durations in the US
and UK. The reason for using the term structure is that the relevant interest rate is often
different in the short run and the long run, and annuity payments are received in both
periods, hence different discount rates should be used.
If the annuity is viewed as guaranteed and risk-free, the government bond rate is
usually appropriate. Alternatively, if some risk is perceived to be involved, the discount
rate  should be  higher. Earlier papers on this  topic used the AA  corporate bond  term
structure as the alternative "risky" rate.
However, in most of the countries in our study government bonds of long duration
were  not  available  and the corporate bond market is thin. For  example, in  Australia,
which has one of the better developed financial markets, the longest government bond
duration is 12 years. In Singapore 10 years is the limit on government bonds; in Chile 18
years. In Israel government bonds have a maximum duration of  15 years and the yield
curve has virtually no slope (in contrast to Switzerland and Singapore which have steep
4  Blake  (1999)  notes that mortality  forecast  errors  of up to 20 percent  over  intervals  as short  as ten
years are not uncommon.
7slopes).  In  cases  where  duration  was  limited,  we  extrapolated  forward  the  last
government bond rate into the future.
The corporate bond market is even more limited and with even less duration. In
Australia, Israel, and Singapore, where the corporate market is too thin to yield a term
structure, 1% was added to the government bond rate to get a "risky" rate. In Switzerland,
where corporate bonds have only a 10 years'  duration, .9% was added to the government
bond  rate  after  2008.  In the  UK where  the  corporate market  is  well developed,  the
government-corporate rate differential of .69% was derived from the  first  10 years of
experience and extrapolated forward; in Canada a similar procedure led to a differential
of .8%. In Chile mortgage bonds were used as the substitute for corporate bonds, and a
constant differential of 1.09% was maintained after 15 years.
How are we to interpret this procedure? Non-existent rates cannot be interpreted
as the rate of return consumers can get on comparable investments. Indeed, consumers,
like insurance companies, cannot make long term investments in economies where these
do not exist. Under these circumstances, the purchase of an annuity may have greater
value to  consumers than these MW ratios indicate, because it fills in  a market gap in
allowing them to make a long term investment. (The existence of a demand for this long
term financial instrument may also create a supply of other long term instruments. For
example, in Chile, AFP's  and insurance companies whose main product is annuities, are
the major holders of medium term home mortgage bonds).
We  interpret  these  rates  simply  as  hypothetical  indications  of  peoples'  time
preferences  and  government  policies  in these  countries. We note that,  despite  global
capital markets, interest rates do vary across countries, and these variations may indicate
time preferences and policies which would continue to obtain over longer durations. One
question we  investigate  is  whether these  variations  in  interest  rates  have  systematic
effects on annuity payouts and MWR's.  The term structure data we used are presented in
Table 1.
Results
Payouts.  Table 2 presents average monthly pay-outs available for a variety of
annuity products in our sample of countries. Pay-outs begin at age 65; for ages 55 and 75
8see the Appendix. Focus first on row 1, Panel A, which deals with nominal annuities for
men. We see there that a  single premium individual annuity (SPIA) that an individual
buys for $100,000 at the age of 65 will yield varying amounts ranging from $590 in
Switzerland to $754 in Canada, with Australia and the UK in the middle. How can we
explain this difference?
Part of the explanation may lie in the international differences in  interest rates.
Insurance companies invest the premium that they receive, and if they expect to  get a
higher return on their investments they are willing to offer a better benefit to consumers.
Indeed, we find a close correspondence between the ranking of countries by interest rates
and their ranking by pay-outs on the nominal SPIA. (The only exception is Singapore,
which may be overpricing its annuities, as discussed below).
Moving  toward  other  annuity products  in  Panel A,  the  data  from  Australia,
Canada  and  the  UK  allow  us  to  measure  the  trade-offs  between  different  types  of
insurance that a worker might want to buy. In Australia, a consumer can get $700 per
month for a SPIA, but if he wants a 10 year guaranteed payment (which would be paid to
his beneficiaries in case of his death) to provide a bequest to his family in case he dies
relatively young, he must forego 6% of that monthly benefit, and will get only $658. If he
wants a joint annuity that will cover both him and his wife (who is assumed to be 5  years
younger in this example) he must forego another $105 which is an additional 15% of the
original price. In Canada and the UK the numbers are not identical but they are similar. In
most  countries, the majority of annuitants choose to purchase guaranteed payments  or
joint annuities in order to provide a survivors' benefit, but they pay an opportunity cost in
terms of a lower initial benefit. In Chile a joint annuity is required. This should be taken
into  account in  projecting the  retirement  savings  that  will  be  needed  to  finance  an
acceptable income level in old age. Because survivors' insurance and bequests through
guaranteed payment periods and joint  annuities are ordinarily part of the package,  the
amount  of savings and  contributions required to  provide a  given replacement  rate  is
greater than it would otherwise be.
Panel B shows that if gender-specific mortality tables are used women get lower
pay-outs  than  men  because  of  their  greater  expected  longevity,  but  the  above
relationships hold for them as well.
9Finally,  looking at Panel C which  presents real  annuity pay-outs  for  the  four
countries  where  they  are  available, we  observe  that  the  rankings  by  pay-outs  again
correspond to rankings by interest rates. (The interest rates given for Chile and Israel are
real while those for Australia and the UK are nominal; the corresponding real rates would
be  about  2  percentage points  lower). For  the UK  and  Australia,  which  offer  level
nominal, indexed and escalating annuities (escalating annuities rise at a fixed rate each
year), the initial pay-out for the level nominal is much higher than for the others although
their relative positions might be reversed 10 years later. Peoples'  choices here depend in
part on their time preferences, suggesting that it is important to offer a range of products
that will satisfy differing tastes to encourage annuitization.
Table 3 presents evidence of price dispersion in Australia, Canada and the UK.
We  see  there  that  pay-outs  are  tightly  clustered,  especially  in  Canada  where  price
dispersion  is  less  than  5%  from  top  to  bottom.  The  ready  availability  of  on-line
information in Canada may lead to clustering for any company that wants to stay in the
market. Unfortunately we do not know the quantities that go along with these prices, nor
do we understand the forces that lead one company to offer better rates than others-
factors such as a desire to increase sales at a particular time, or to offset life insurance
risk,  or  to  take  advantage  of  good  investment  opportunities  may  be  involved.  In
Switzerland prices are uniform, set by the Life Insurance Association, and in Israel they
are also reputed to be uniform given a tradition of cartel-like behavior in the insurance
industry, but that may change in the future due to pressures for greater competition.
The  high money's  worth ratio of nominal  annuities.  Table  4  presents  the
money's  worth ratio for annuities that begin at age 65 for our sample countries, using the
government bond risk-free rate. (MWRs beginning at ages 55 and 75 are shown in the
Appendix).  We observe,  first, that among nominal  annuities, and  using the  annuitant
mortality tables, the MWRs exceed 96% for every annuity type and country and  100%
for Canada, Singapore and Switzerland. The MWR is highest in countries with a steep
term structure, which allows insurance companies to earn higher long term rates (some of
which makes its way into pay-outs) while the MWR is discounted at the lower short term
rate for many years; this probably accounts for the exceptional MWRs in Switzerland and
Singapore. Another reason may be that Swiss annuities include a "bonus"--about  10% of
10the total pay-out--which has been given regularly but is not guaranteed, hence investment
and  cohort  mortality  risk  are  effectively  shared  with  annuitants  in  Switzerland  (In
Singapore the guaranteed annuity that we are working with must compete with variable
"participating" annuities that are offered and popular).
Although pay-outs were much lower for women, the MWR is the same for both
genders, once life expectancy is taken into account. With the exception of Australia, these
numbers are higher than those found in earlier studies for the UK and UK (Mitchell et al
1997, Brown et al 1999, Poterba and Warshawsky 1999, Finkelstein and Poterba 1999).
If people want a risk-free annuity and if these annuities are indeed risk-free, they have
gotten a good deal, paying virtually nothing for longevity and investment insurance.
The average worker and adverse selection.  However, if we use the mortality
tables for the entire population, the MWRs drop by 6-9%. For example, an Australian
worker with an expected lifetime that is average for the population as a whole, who wants
to buy a SPIA, will only get a MWR of 91.4%. She is paying about  1.5% for general
expenses and 7% in "adverse selection costs. Earlier studies have also found evidence of
adverse selection, although usually somewhat larger.
One of the reasons for adverse selection is well known--asymmetric information.
Consumers  know more  about  their health  status  and  life  expectancy  than  insurance
companies, but "good" risks (who will die young) are unable to signal this to insurance
companies  to  secure  a  better  rate,  so  they  withdraw  from  the  market,  leaving  the
companies  only  with  the "bad"  risks, with  greater than average  longevity-which  is
exactly what we find. Annuitants have greater longevity than the population as a whole.
Therefore, when we measure the MWR using the average population-wide life tables, we
get a lower MWR. The inability of the "average" worker to get insurance on actuarially
fair terms (which may discourage him from purchasing it) is a classical market failure
and has sometimes been used as an argument for mandatory annuitization.
Of course, asymmetric information is not the only reason for the appearance of
adverse selection. Another reason may be that voluntary annuities are a "luxury"  good
with a high income elasticity of demand so wealthy people, who have greater longevity,
are disproportionately buyers. Insurance companies could charge these people a higher
11risk  premium,  since  their higher  income  and  wealth  is  readily  observable.  But  they
don't-or  do they?
Each  annuity  contract  has  a  fixed  cost  attached  and  this  will  be  a  smaller
percentage of a large policy. Rich people tend to buy larger policies. Implicitly, annuity
companies  may be  charging a  higher  risk premium  with  a  smaller  expense  ratio  to
wealthier people who buy larger policies and a lower risk premium with a higher expense
ratio to poor people who buy smaller policies. In this case, the higher fee charged to low
earners may dissuade them from purchasing annuities but it is not an example of market
failure since it reflects real costs. Additionally, even if low earners were not charged a
higher fee (given a lower MWR), many of them might have chosen not to buy an annuity
given  the  constraints  on  their  income.  The  adverse  selection  stemming  from  the
correlation of income with longevity and annuity purchases is not an example of market
failure although it clearly has policy implications (for a further discussion of selection
issues see Finkelstein and Poterba 1999).
In  some  countries  "adverse  selection"  is  due  to  government  regulations.  For
example, in Chile, the annuity option is only open to workers who can afford to buy an
annuity that  is  at least  110% of  the minimum pension  guarantee. Low  and  transient
earners-who  tend to  have lower  longevity-are  left out by definition. Moreover, the
annuity market is effectively part of the AFP system, which primarily serves the upper
half of the income distribution and urban residents, who have longer life expectancies.
Thus, at least three possible reasons account for the fact that the MWR is lower
for the average member of the population than for the group that purchases  annuities.
And we don't  know what proportion is due to asymmetric information. But perhaps the
most  striking  observation  is  that,  in  all  of  our  sample  countries,  even  the  average
population member loses less than 10 cents on the dollar if he or she decides to purchase
a nominal annuity, and only 6-7 cents are lost due to adverse selection, broadly defined.
Self-selection as an antidote to adverse selection.  One reason why asymmetric
information may not play a larger role is that insurance companies and their customers
have an incentive to find self-selection techniques that will lead good risks into their own
segregated  groups. A person who expects to  live  a long time  might purchase  a  level
SPIA, but a person who expects to die young is more likely to purchase an annuity with a
12guaranteed payment  period or  a joint  annuity  with  a  beneficiary  who  will  continue
collecting after the primary annuitant dies.  So, we would expect adverse selection (as
measured  by  the  difference  in  MWR  between  the  annuitant  group  and  the  entire
population) to be smaller for joint annuities and guaranteed period annuities. Indeed, that
is exactly what we find.
Taking Australia as an example, the difference between the two MWR's  for the
level simple annuity is 7.2%, but the difference for the annuity with a 10 year guarantee
is 5.6% and for the joint annuity only 4.1%. In Canada the 10 year guarantee cuts the
differential from 8.9% to 6.7%, in Switzerland from 20.3% to 16.9% and in the UK from
6.9% to 4.8%. Signaling mechanisms apparently do exist and they cut adverse selection
costs  (including  those  due both  to  asymmetric information and  income  elasticities of
demand) in most cases. Most people who purchase annuities avail themselves of these
signaling devices, as only a minority of annuity purchases are a simple SPIA. At the same
time,  the majority of the population  is unwilling to  buy annuities  at these prevailing
prices (and therefore probably at the actuarially fair price too).
Using the "risky" corporate discount rate. Not surprisingly, when we examine
the MWR using the corporate rate of discount, we find lower MWR's  (Table  5). The
reduction varies from 8% in Australia where the imputed corporate rate premium is 1%,
to a  5% reduction in the UK where the rate differential is lower. While  annuitants in
Singapore and Switzerland still get more than 100%, in other countries the MWR has
dropped to 90-97%. And if an average population member want to purchase longevity
insurance, he or she would have to lose 10-15 cents on the dollar in most cases. Adverse
selection (broadly defined) still accounts for only 5-7 cents of that total, but the higher
discount rate accounts for the rest and it is substantial.
Which is the appropriate discount rate?  This depends on peoples'  degree of
risk aversion as well as the safety of the promised annuities. On the second point: Even
though insurance companies offer "guaranteed annuities" they may not be able to honor
their guarantees in the distant future. Insurance companies, like countries, do not have
reliable mortality tables, especially in the early years of the industry. They do not know
what interest rates will prevail in the future, or what their rate of return will be on equity
and real estate. While the annuity business is small and immature, these questions  are
13disregarded. But eventually, if the annuity business should grow large, and if mortality
improves at a faster rate than expected, the company may find itself unable to keep its
promises. In that case, "guaranteed"  annuities are not completely risk  free, the higher
risky rate applies, and annuities become a less desirable purchase.
On the first point: Even if annuities were risk-free, many people may prefer to
accept higher risk on investments in order to get higher return. If they are forced to accept
a risk-free annuity, because that is the only kind that is offered, their utility will not be
maximized. The higher corporate discount rate is appropriate for them  and it correctly
informs us that they are receiving a lower MWR because of their lack of access to riskier
annuities. We will discuss below some of the ways this situation might be remedied.
Real annuities.  While increasing the discount rate has a  large impact on the
MWR, an even larger impact comes from the use of real (indexed) rather than nominal
annuities. In Chile and Israel the entire economy is indexed, so annuities must be too. In
Australia and the UK indexed annuities are available, albeit not very popular. When we
look at the MWR ratios we understand why.
As noted above, the pay-outs for real annuities are consistently and substantially
less  than  for  nominal  annuities  and,  perhaps  more  interesting,  the  MWR  is  also
consistently less. Using the risk-free discount rate, in the UK a real annuity yields 88%,
which is 9% less than an equivalent nominal annuity. The MWR in Israel and Chile are
higher-92-94%--but  this is lower than for any nominal annuity in our sample. Using
population  mortality  tables,  these  numbers  become  still  lower--80%-87%.  Using  the
corporate discount rate of course depresses the MWR further, to  82-86% for annuitants
and 74-80% for the average member of the population. A person who is not averse to
taking investment risk but wants to be protected against inflation risk will have to pay a
large premium--of  15-25 cents on the dollar--to  obtain inflation insurance.  (The only
exception is the new mandatory pension system in Israel, where indexed annuities  are
subsidized by the government in the form of high interest bonds that are issued to the
pension funds. For this subsidized group, the MWR exceeds 100%).
The  same picture  was found earlier for the UK  by Brown  et al  1999 and by
Finkelstein  and Poterba 1999, who offered several possible explanations, chief among
them  being  greater  adverse  selection  among purchasers  of  indexed  annuities  whose
14benefits are back-loaded. That explanation does not fit another fact, however:  In both
Australia and the UK, where we have data for escalating annuities whose value increases
at a fixed rate (5% in Australia, 3% in the UK) ever year, their MWR is about the same as
for  other nominal  annuities  and  much higher than that  for real  annuities.  If  adverse
selection induced by backloading were the culprit, that should lead to a lower MWR ratio
among escalating as well as indexed annuities.
Rather, we suggest that the explanation for the lower MWR of real annuities is
that insurance companies cannot engage in risk intermediation as freely when they sell an
indexed  annuity, because  the only  investment that  will allow them  to  hedge  against
inflation risk is indexed bonds, primarily government bonds, and if  they do this  they
forego the spread from higher yielding investments. If they try to avoid inflation risk,
they get lower yields. If they invest in higher yields, they face inflation risk. Even if they
choose the lower yield route, indexed annuities expose them to higher reinvestment risk
and consequently to higher reserve requirements, since the longest duration for indexed
instruments is shorter than for ordinary bonds. Thus insurance companies that offer real
annuities face a trade-off between inflation risk and low returns-they  must face one or
the other or both. In any case, the consumer is stuck with a higher price. It is interesting
in this  respect that  Chile, which has the broadest range of indexed instruments of the
three countries, also has the best terms for indexed annuities.
III.  Policy Implications
Annuities and risk intermediation
It is difficult to  separate out the expenses and investment returns of the annuity
business  versus  other  business  of  the  same  insurance  companies.  In  Canada,  total
insurance expenses are estimated to be 5.5% of premiums, including sales commissions
that  are 3%  for the first  $100,000 in premiums, falling to  1% for larger  amounts. In
Singapore expenses are estimated to be about 4%, including a 1% sales commission, plus
a large management fee. In Australia and Chile sales commissions are as high as 4 and
5%, respectively. How do insurance companies cover these costs, if the risk-free MWR
15for their  nominal annuitants  is  in the vicinity of  1? The answer to  this  question  has
broader implications for the way annuity markets should be organized.
We have argued that annuity costs are covered by the spread between the risk free
rate on which the high MWR was based and the riskier portfolios in which they invest.
Moreover, insurance companies can invest their reserves in long term assets which may
earn a higher return, while individuals still get some of their returns  in short term pay-
outs. For  example, in  Chile 50% of insurance company investments  are in  corporate
bonds,  mortgage  bonds,  real  estate  and  equity.  During  the  1990's  their  annual  real
portfolio return ranged between 4.7 and 10.7%, with a simple annual average of 7.3%. In
Singapore, a third of all investments were in equities and another quarter in real estate
and  loans.  Annuity  companies  in  the UK,  Canada and  Switzerland  also  invest  in  a
mixture  of  corporate  bonds,  equity,  real  estate  and  foreign  assets,  in  addition  to
government bonds. The Swiss insurance companies may earn a high enough return on its
diversified, long term and foreign investments (despite the low short term interest rate in
the economy) to allow it to offer the very high MWR that we have reported above.
Under this version of the world, annuities can be backed by long term investments
because the insurance company has a multi-generational life in which earlier investments
can be used to  finance near-term pay-outs. And annuities are "safe"  because  they are
guaranteed by the insurance company. The company turns risky investments into "safe"
annuities by investment diversification, by sharing risk across several different product
lines including life insurance and annuities whose risk is negatively correlated, and by
paying a premium to  stockholders whose profits  (positive or negative) act as a buffer
between unexpected events and their  insured customers.
Public versus private provision
This  view  has implications  for the relative efficiency  of private  versus public
provision of annuities in a funded system. Some people have argued that the provision of
all annuities in a multi-pillar system should be turned over to a single public monopoly
that the worker must use upon retirement. But if  insurance companies can cut their costs
by  providing  risk  intermediation,  this  is  an  argument for  private  rather  than  public
provision.  A  public  monopolistic  annuity  company  should  not  invest  in  a  broadly
16diversified  portfolio  since this will lead toward  public  control  of a large share of assets in
many economies,  it should  not offer a wide range of insurance  products  or it will crowd
out the private insurance  sector,  and it does not have  stockholders  whose function  it is to
buffer some of the risk. Instead,  taxpayers  at large become  the buffer, and this may have
undesirable efficiency as well as equity consequences. 5 For these reasons, a public
monopoly does not have the same ability to turn high risk investment into low risk
annuities  efficiently  that a private  company  has.
Of course, the opposite side of the coin is that the incentive system may lead
private insurance  companies  to price over-optimistically  in order to sell policies. Each
annuity involves a large premium, all of which is paid, with a commission,  up front. It
will be many years--perhaps  20 or more--before  the company  knows for sure whether it
has made a profit or a loss on that class of policies. When  the annuity  business is only a
small part of the total insurance  business,  the company  will be able to cover any annuity
losses out of its other income, and with the annuity business growing,  the cash inflow
will exceed  the out-flow  for many years.  Furthermore,  companies  may deliberately  run a
temporary  loss on new  products in order  to establish  a market  position. Singapore  may be
in that position now, which may be one explanation  for its exceptionally  high MWR's.
But this situation  is obviously  not sustainable  in the long run. If the annuity business is
underfunded  as it grows, this will eventually  come back to haunt. This possibility  is one
reason why the higher risky discount  rate may be appropriate  and, as we have seen, this
rate yields a lower  MWR.
This is also a reason why heavy government  regulation  of insurance  providers is
essential, to keep risk down and MWR up, by setting rigorous reserve and matching
requirements. It is especially essential for providers of long term insurance such as
annuities  where  the market  cannot  be counted  on to provide  immediate  feedback.
5Between  1906  and 1968  the Canadian  government  dominated  the annuity  market in that country. Out-
dated  mortality  tables  were used and government  subsidies  became  necessary.  Finally,  during  the period of
volatile interest  rates in the 1960's, the public company  was unable to keep up with interest rate changes
and the rapid price changes  that this required.  The public  monopoly  went out of business and the private
annuity  industry  began  to develop.
17How to combine longevity insurance with investment risk?
Many  people  may  wish  to  insure  themselves  against  an  unexpectedly  long
lifetime, fearing that they will run out of money in old age. But they may be willing to
accept some investment risk to increase their incomes, especially during "young" old age.
The experience of Switzerland indicates that this strategy may indeed yield a high return.
For people who are less risk averse, the high discount rate may be relevant and they are
getting a lower MWR than those who want to avoid investment risk.
We  might  wonder,  then,  why  more  companies  don't  offer  profit-sharing  or
participating annuities, in which payments vary with investment earnings. These are rare
in most countries.  A basic reason is the principal-agent problem:  workers may not trust
insurance companies as investment managers enough to turn over a large premium on an
irrevocable basis to them. Once a company had a large amount of committed money, it
might  choose not  to  maximize  returns, to  the detriment of  the worker.  In  Singapore
participating annuities are very popular and the largest issuer is an insurance company
that is run by the trade unions with which many workers are affiliated, which they may
consequently consider "trustworthy."
Most  schemes  allow some  kind  of  "gradual  withdrawal"  and  these  are  very
popular among workers who want to earn a higher risk premium and control their own
investments rather  than turning that  responsibility  over to  a third  party. In  Australia
"allocated annuities" which are not really annuities but are constrained withdrawals, are
the most popular pay-out technique for that reason. In Chile about half of retirees select
programmed withdrawals, keeping their money in diversified portfolios in AFPs. But in
doing so they forego longevity insurance. It would be useful to develop instruments that
allowed workers to insure against unexpectedly high longevity while still retaining some
control over the investment of their money. The relatively low MWR using the corporate
discount rate suggests that some workers would be made significantly better off in this
case.
Valdes has suggested such a scheme: it would allow a group of companies to pool
their longevity risk, while workers could choose and switch amongst them as investment
managers  (Valdes  1998, Valdes and Edwards  1997). This would operate  similarly to
TIAA-CREF,  which  offers  variable  annuities  and  allows  workers  to  shift  across
18portfolios during  retirement,  but  with  several different  companies  rather than  only  a
single one. Under this scheme, workers would be placed into pools according to their risk
classification  and  several asset  managers would be  associated with  each  pool.  Upon
annuitizing, workers would receive a fixed number of annuity units, but the value of the
unit would fluctuate according to the investment success of the asset managers, much as
the value of a share of a mutual fund varies. Longevity risk would be shared within the
entire pool,  so money would be transferred if some asset managers had above average
longevity and others below average.
Of  course,  if  workers  earned  the  higher  rate  of  return  from  higher  risk
investments, insurance companies would no longer be able to cover their costs out of the
interest rate  spread (e.g. the  equity premium) and would have to charge  explicitly for
their  expense  and profits.  Thus,  if  such  annuities  developed,  expected  pay-outs  and
MWRs would increase but transparent expense ratios would also increase.
Inflation insurance-can  it be provided by the private sector?
We have seen that real annuities are often not available and when available they
are relatively expensive-their  MWR is 9% lower than that of nominal annuities and (at
risk-free  rates)  consumers  tend  to  lose  6-12  cents  on  the  dollar.  This  cost  is  not
prohibitive, but it is noticeable. We have argued that this is due primarily to the lack of
indexed  investment instruments in most  economies. Indeed, in  Chile, where  they  are
more broadly available, the MWR of indexed annuities is higher than elsewhere. One
type of instrument that is generally not available, for example, is very long term indexed
government bonds.
The relatively high cost of indexed annuities has been pointed to by some people
as a rationale for public provision. However, if the government issues an annuity, e.g. in
the form of an indexed DB PAYG pension, this is also costly. It is effectively issuing
implicit indexed long term debt. If it is willing to issue long term indexed debt, it could
do so in the form of an explicit bond, which is much more transparent. And insurance
companies  would  then  have  an  easier  time  offering  annuities,  including  indexed
annuities. The fact that many governments are not  willing to offer long  term indexed
explicit debt but are willing to offer generous long term indexed implicit debt suggests
19that they may prefer the nontransparent nature of the implicit debt. But transparent debt is
more amenable to good governance and citizenship than nontransparent debt. Inflation
insurance is costly, whether publicly or privately provided, but  governments can take
steps to  make private  provision  less costly than it currently  is  by  issuing  long  term
indexed bonds. Insurance companies can make inflation insurance more affordable by
arrangements that index partially or with caps and floors, thereby cutting off the tails of
the cost distribution. Some governments have also instituted such arrangements in their
public pension plans.
Adverse  selection  and mandatory  annuitization
Some  people argue that  annuitization should  be  made  mandatory  to  alleviate
adverse selection. We believe there are good reasons for mandating a modest level of
annuitization through the first or second pillar-reasons  primarily stemming from myopia
and moral hazard problems-but  the evidence does not support the idea that many people
would be made better off if a higher level of annuitization were mandatory.
Adverse selection is an argument for mandatory annuitization if we believe that a
large number of people who would want to buy annuities at actuarially fair price are kept
out of the market by asymmetric information. But we have just  seen that this is unlikely
to be the case. Adverse selection, broadly defined, raises the cost about 7%. This cost can
be and often is reduced to 5-6% by utilizing a guarantee period or a joint annuity, which
are  more  likely  to  be  priced  according  to  population  mortality  tables.  Part  of  the
remaining difference between population  mortality and annuitant mortality  is probably
due to income correlated with both with a demand for annuities and longevity-which  is
not a source of market failure.
Suppose that cost were to decrease by 5-6% (MWR increase by 5-6%), making
the system actuarially fair for the average member of the population. How many people
would enter the market? This is the same as asking what is the cost elasticity of demand. 6
Assuming a neutral  elasticity of  1, quantity demanded would increase by 5-6%. Even
6 We use the term "cost elasticity"  because  "price" is ambiguous  in this context.  We might think  of "price"
as the total premium  paid for the policy  or, alternatively,  as the difference  between  the premium  paid and
the present  value of the benefit  stream  received,  i.e. as 1  -MWR.  A 1%  change  in premium,  or cost,  would
20with an elasticity of 2, quantity demanded would go up only 10-12%. Most people would
still stay out of the market.
These numbers suggest that most people who would be forced into a mandatory
annuity market would prefer not to buy at an actuarially fair price. Forcing them to buy
(beyond the modest amount dictated by myopia and moral hazard) in order to obtain an
actuarially fair price for those who want to buy is not only inefficient, it is "unfair"  in
terms  of  equity.  The main beneficiaries  would be  wealthy people  who  would have
bought anyway, while the main losers are poor people who have a high opportunity cost.
(The impact of differential mortality on redistribution under mandatory annuitization is
discussed in Brown 1999).
The challenge for the future
Nevertheless,  as multi-pillar systems grow, the pay-out phase  will have to  be
constrained to  make sure that  people do not  run  out  of money  before they die,  and
annuities  are bound  to  be  an  important option  within  that  constrained  system.  The
challenge for countries that have already reformed their accumulation phase will be to
design  a  decumulation  phase  that  is  cost-effective  and  consistent  with  peoples'
preferences.  This means that sufficient product variety should be permitted to  satisfy
diverse tastes and any restrictions should be thought through carefully. Chile requires all
annuitants to purchase a joint annuity (to provide survivors insurance), does not permit
profit-sharing annuities and gives workers considerable flexibility concerning when pay-
outs begin. Singapore encourages single annuities,  permits participating  annuities  and
requires that pay-outs should begin exactly at age 62.  One desirable restriction may be to
standardize product descriptions to facilitate price competition and informed choice.
The numbers we have presented suggest that annuity companies are capable of
functioning  effectively,  even in  countries  that  do  not  have well  developed  financial
markets. Consumers do indeed get their money's worth, seemingly more so than in other
countries than in the US or UK, providing nominal annuities are desired and risk-free
discount rates are appropriate. Part of the challenge for governments is to ensure that the
imply a small proportionate  change in the price under  the first defmnition  but a much larger proportionate
change  in price under  the second  definition.
21risk  free rate  is  appropriate by  tight regulations regarding funding and disclosure
requirements,  and to encourage  institutional  arrangements  that enable consumers with
higher risk preferences to  bear some investment risk while still retaining longevity
insurance.
The biggest  weakness  of the annuity  market seems to be its inability  to deal with
inflation protection in a low-cost way. Contrary to previous belief, private insurance
companies can  and  do  provide indexed annuities in  several countries. However,
consumers  pay 10-12  cents on the dollar for this protection,  while nominal  annuities  cost
practically  nothing. Of course, inflation insurance  is never low cost, whether provided
through the market or the public sector. Governments  can facilitate low cost indexed
annuities by issuing long term indexed bonds and by keeping inflation under control.
Annuity companies  can facilitate them by providing partial inflation insurance. Until
these policies  are in place, indexed  annuities  are unlikely  to develop.
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Term  Structure  of Government  Rates
Year  Australia  Canada  Switzerland  UK  Singapore  Chile  Israel
1  4.67  5.43  2.08  4.94  2.38  8.14  4.3
2  4.69  5.35  2.08  4.94  2.38  8.14  4.1
3  4.70  5.53  2.08  4.89  2.88  7.22  4.0
4  4.74  5.55  2.13  4.85  3.39  7.22  3.8
5  4.80  5.58  2.53  4.81  3.89  6.73  3.7
6  4.89  5.64  2.53  4.77  4.15  6.73  3.6
7  4.99  5.71  2.53  4.74  4.41  6.73  3.3
8  5.00  5.69  2.53  4.71  4.53  6.66  3.4
9  5.04  5.68  2.53  4.68  4.65  6.66  3.4
10  5.07  5.67  2.71  4.66  4.76  6.67  3.4
10  5.09  5.69  2.71  4.63  4.76  6.67  3.4
12  5.13  5.71  2.71  4.61  4.76  6.65  3.4
13  5.13  5.72  2.71  4.59  4.76  6.65  3.4
14  5.13  5.75  2.71  4.57  4.76  6.67  3.4
15  5.13  5.77  2.71  4.56  4.76  6.67  3.4
16  5.13  5.79  2.71  4.54  4.76  6.67  3.4
17  5.13  5.81  4.05  4.53  4.76  6.67  3.4
18  5.13  5.84  4.05  4.52  4.76  6.67  3.4
19  5.13  5.86  4.05  4.51  4.76  6.67  3.4
20  5.13  5.88  4.05  4.50  4.76  6.45  3.4
21  5.13  5.87  4.05  4.50  4.76  6.45  3.4
22  5.13  5.86  4.05  4.49  4.76  6.45  3.4
23  5.13  5.85  4.12  4.49  4.76  6.45  3.4
24  5.13  5.84  4.12  4.49  4.76  6.45  3.4
25  5.13  5.83  4.12  4.49  4.76  6.45  3.4
26  5.13  5.83  4.12  4.49  4.76  6.45  3.4
27  5.13  5.82  4.12  4.49  4.76  6.45  3.4
28  5.13  5.81  4.23  4.49  4.76  6.45  3.4
29  5.13  5.80  4.23  4.49  4.76  6.45  3.4
30  5.13  5.79  4.23  4.49  4.76  6.45  3.4
Term Structure  of Corporate  Rates
Australia  Canada  Switzerland  UK  Singapore  Chile  Israel
Gvt+  1  Gvt+0.8  Gvt+09  Gvt+ 0.69  Gvt+  4  Gvt+ 1.09  Gvt+ I
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Monthly  Pay-Outs per Immediate Annuities at Age 65
($100,000 premium)*
A. Male -Nominal
Australia  Canada  UK  Switzerland  Singapore 0
Level SPIAa  700  738  709  590
Level  SPIA  + 1OYGO  658  706  674  571  635
Escalating SPIAC  431  550
Joint  SPIA"  543  664  626  501
B. Male - Real
Australia  UK  Chile  Israel
Level  SPIAP  563  509  820  625
Level SPIA + 10YGD  531  761  584
Joint SPIAa  427  731
C. Female - Nominal
__________________  Australia  Canada  UK  Switzerland  Singapore'
Level  SPIA8  621  662  624  526
Level  SPIA  +  1 OYGD  599  648  611  519  600
Escalating SPIAC  356  463
D. Female - Real
|  Australia  UK  Chile  Israel
Level  SPIA  484  f  425  723  552
Level SPIA + 10YGD  469  695  530
See  Appendix  for  ages  55  and  65
a SPIA  = single  premium  immediate  annuity
b 1OYG  means  payment  continues  for  at least  10  years  even  if individual  dies;  beneficiary  is
named
c Escalating  annuity  means  that  payment  increases  at fixed  rate  per  year-5% for  Australia,  3%
UK
Payout  given  is for initial  year;  in  later  years  payout  will  be  higher
d Joint  annuity  is based  on  assumption  that  both  spouses  are  same  age  and  survivor  gets  50%
of initial  payout.  In Chile  survivor  gets  60%.  For  Australia  husband  is assumed  to be  65,  wife  is 60
and  survivor  gets  85%  of initial  payout.
e For  Singapore  annuity  begins  at age  62  (a requirement  of  the Minimum  Sum  Scheme  of the
CPF)  and  carries  15  years  of guaranteed  benefits.
24TABLE 3
Price Dispersion in The Annuity Market
Monthly Pay-Outs, Male Age 65 (SPIA)
UK  Australia  Canada
Top  1  772  764  754
j5'n  Best  723  720*  748
Average  708  700  738  (Median)
Worst  626  723
*  This is AMP  price, not  5th best
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Money's  Worth  Ratio (MWR) with Risk-Free  Interest  Rate - Age 65 (as %)
A. Male - Nominal
Australia  Canada  UK  Switzerland  Singapore
Gen. P.  Ann. P.  Gen. P.  Ann. P.  Gen. P.  Ann. P.  Gen. P.  Ann. P.  Ann. P.
Level  SPIA  91.4  98.6  92.5  101.4  89.7  96.6  96.5  116.9  125.6
Level  SPIA  91.9  97.5  93.9  100.6  92.7  97.5  99.6  116.5
Escalating SPIA  89.3  101.6  88.6  97.1
Joint SPIA  95.9  100.1  I  91.7  97.1  87.7  105.3
B. Male - Real
Australia  UK  Chile  Israel
Gen. P.  Ann. P.  Gen. P.  Ann. P.  Gen. P.  Ann. P.  Gen. P.  Ann. P  Mandat.
Level SPIA  80.1  87.8  86.8  93.9  79.9  92.1  116.0
Level SPIA  88.9  93.3  82.6  91.4
+  10YG__  ___  __  _  _
Joint SPIA  80.3  86.3  88.4  92.7
C. Female  - Nominal
Australia  Canada  UK  Switzerland  Singapore
Gen. P.  Ann. P.  Gen. P.  Ann. P.  Gen. P.  Ann. P.  Gen. P.  Ann. P.  Gen. P. Ann.P.
Level  SPIA  91.4  97.0  93.7  101.5  91.0  95.7  102.9  115.2  l
Level  SPIA  91.3  96.0  94.8  101.3  93.3  96.8  104.4  115.2  124.5
lEscalating  SPIA  88.0  97.9  _  __  ____  89.4  95.4  ___  ___  ___  _  _
D. Female  - Real
Australia  UK  Chile  Israel
|  |PGen.  P. Ann. P.|Gen.  P. Ann.  P. Gen.  P.Ann.  P.|Gen.  P.  Ann. P  Mandat.
Level  SPIA  79.8  85.0  86.6  94.7  76.0  91.1  124
Level  SPIA  87.8  94.0  78.4  90.6
See  Appendix  for ages 55  and 75
Gen. P. = general  population
Ann. P. = annuitant  population
For Israel,  mandatory  pension  is a mandatory  contribution  for covered  group.  It yields a deferred
pension  that  must  be purchased  annually  with payout  beginning  at age 65. MWR  is shown  for
purchase  at age  55 with payout  beginning  at age 65.
For  other definitions  and notes  see table  2.
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Money's  Worth  Ratio (MWR) with Corporate  Rate - Age 65 (as %)
A. Male - Nominal
Australia  Canada  UK  Switzerland  Singapore
Gen.  P. Ann.  P. Gen.  P. Ann.  P. Gen.  P. Ann.  P. Gen.  P. Ann.  P.  Ann.  P.
Level  SPIA  84.6  90.6  86.9  94.7  85.4  91.6  92.2  110.4  107.3
Level  SPIA  85.2  89.8  88.3  94.0  88.3  92.5  95.3  110.1
+  10YG__  ___  __  _  _
Escalating  SPIA  80.9  90.8  81.1  88.4
Joint  SPIA  _  86.7  91.5  _
B. Male - Real
Australia  |  UK  Chile  Israel
Gen. P.  Ann.  P.  Gen.  P.  Ann. P.  Gen. P.  Ann.  P.  Gen. P.  Ann. P  Mandat.
Level SPIA  75.6  82.3  80.2  86.3  74.2  84.7  99.0
Level  SPIA  82.2  85.8  76.7  84.0
+  IOY G_  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _
Joint SPIA  75.0  80.3  80.9  84.5
C. Female - Nominal
Australia  Canada  UK  Switzerland  Singapore
Gen.  P. Ann.  P. Gen.  P. Ann.  P. Gen.  P. Ann.  P. Gen.  P.  I  Ann.  P.  Ann.  P.
Level  SPIA  83.9  88.5  87.4  94.1  86.0  90.1  97.4  108.3  105.8
Level  SPIA  83.9  87.7  88.4  93.9  88.1  91.3  98.9  108.3
+  10YG_  _  _  _  __  _  __  ___  _  _
Escalating  SPIA  78.6  86.5  _  81.0  86.0  l
D. Female - Real
Australia  UK  Chile  Israel
|__________  |Gen.  P.  Ann. P.  Gen. P.  Ann. P.  Gen. P.  Ann. P.  Gen. P.  Ann. P  iMandat.
Level  SPIA  74.5  79.1  78.8  85.9  70.3  83.0  104.2
Level  SPIA  80.4  85.4  72.5  82.5
+ 10YG
*  See  Tables  2 and  4 for notes  and  definitions
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Annuity  Pay-Outs per  Immediate  Annuities  at Age 55
($100,000 premium)*
A. Male - Nominal
Canada  UK  Switzerland
Level  SPIA  605  474
Level  SPIA  + 1  OYG  597  _  469
Escalating  SPIA
Joint  SPIA  561  __  _  421
B. Male -Real
_____  __ UK  Chile  Israel
Level  SPIA  650  460
Level  SPIA  +  10YG  632  451
Joint  SPIA  _  597
C. Female - Nominal
Canada  UK  Switzerland
Level  SPIA  562  435
Level  SPIA  +  1OYG  559  433
Escalating  SPIA
D. Female - Real
UK  Chile  Israel
Level  SPIA  _  591  420
Level  SPIA  + 1  OYG  |  583  415
See  Table  2 for notes  and  definitions
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Annuity  Pay-Outs  per Immediate Annuities  at Age 75
($100,000 premium)*
A. Male - Nominal
Canada  UK  Switzerland
Level  SPIA  1016  1030  821
Level  SPIA + I OYG  862  842  725
Escalating  SPIA  851
Joint  SPIA  1  869  _859  1
B. Male - Real
l____  _  UK  Chile  Israel
Level  SPIA  799  1130  953
Level  SPIA  + IOYG  _  _  918  760
Joint  SPIA  971
C. Female - Nominal
Canada  UK  Switzerland
Level  SPIA  876  871  720
Level  SPIA + IOYG  797  776  675
Escalating  SPIA  706
D. Female  -Real
UK  Chile  Israel
Level  SPIA  669  965  814
Level SPIA + I OYG  852_  701
*  See  Table  2 for notes  and  definitions
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Money's  Worth Ratio (MWR) with Risk-Free Interest Rate - Age 55 (as %)*
A. Male - Nominal
Canada  UK  Switzerland  Singapore
Gen. P.  Ann.  P.  Gen.  P.  Ann. P.  Gen. P.  Ann.  P.  Ann.  P.
Level  SPIA  94.9  100.0  98.5  104.3  119.5  99.0
Level  SPIA  95.5  100.2  105.2  119.3
+  IOYG__  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  __  _
Escalating  SPIA  l
Joint  SPIA
B. Male - Real
UK  Chile  Israel
Gen. P.  Ann. P.  Gen. P.  Ann.  P.  Gen. P.  Ann. P
Level  SPIA  =  __  _  86.0  90.9  80.3  88.9
Level  SPIA  86.6  90.5  81.0  88.6 + IOYG  =  8
Joint  SPIA  |  _  86.5  89.4  c
C. Female - Nominal
Canada  UK  Switzerland  Singapore
Gen. P.  Ann. P.  Gen. P.  Ann.  P.  Gen.  P.  Ann. P.  Ann. P.
Level  SPIA  95.0  99.9  _  108.4  116.9  98.5
Level  SPIA  95.6  100.0  108.7  117.0
+  IOQYG__  _  __  __  _  _
Escalating  SPIA
D. Female - Real
UK  Chile  Israel
Gen. P.  Ann. P.  Gen.  P.  Ann. P.  Gen.  P.  Ann. P
Level  SPIA  84.8  90.5  78.3  88.1
Level  SPIA  r85.3  |90.2  78.7  87.8
*  See  Tables  2 and  4 for notes  and  definitions
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Money's  Worth  Ratio (MWR) with Risk-Free  Interest  Rate - Age 75 (as %)*
A. Male -Nominal
Canada  UK  Switzerland
Gen. P.  Ann. P.  Gen. P.  Ann.  P.  Gen.  P.  Ann. P.
Level  SPIA  88.9  103.6  85.0  94.0  85.4  111.1
Level  SPIA  92.4  100.1  92.0  95.8  94.7  110.0
+  10YG_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Escalating  SPIA  _  82.0  92.2  _
Joint  SPIA  86.8  94.7  76.8  99.5
B. Male - Real
UK  Chile  Israel
Gen. P.  Ann.  P.  Gen.  P.  Ann. P.  Gen.  P.  Ann. P
Level  SPIA  77.6  87.1  86.5  94.7  79.7  95.6
Level  SPIA  91.3  94.5  86.9  93.2
+ 10YG
Joint  SPIA  79.1  87.6  89.0  94.1
C. Female  - Nominal
Canada  UK  Switzerland
Gen.  P.  Ann. P.  Gen. P.  Ann. P.  Gen.  P.  Ann. P.
Level  SPIA  93.3  103.5  87.1  94.2  94.7  109.5
Level  SPIA  95.2  101.9  91.7  96.1  99.5  109.2
+ IOYG
Escalating  SPIA  84.9  93.4
D. Female - Real
UK  Chile  Israel
Gen. P.  Ann.  P.  Gen.  P. Ann. . P.  PAnn.  P
Level  SPIA  79.1  87.1  86.5  97.7  72.5  94.8
Lee  10YGI=  90.4  96.0  81.5  |93.1 + 10YGfi
*  See  Tables  2 and  4 for notes  and  definitions
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Money's  Worth  Ratio (MWR) with Corporate  Rate - Age 55 (%)
A. Male -Nominal
Canada  UK  Switzerland
Gen. P.  Ann. P.  Gen. P.  Ann.  P. Gen.  P.  Ann. P.
Level  SPIA  87.7  91.9  97.6  110.3




B. Male - Real
UK  Chile  Israel
Gen.  P.  Ann. P.  Gen.  P.  Ann. P.  Gen. P.  Ann. P  Mandat.
Level  SPIA  77.9  81.8  72.7  79.7
Level  SPIA  78.4  81.5  73.4  79.4
+  10YGj_______ 
___
Joint  SPIA  77.6  |  79.9
C. Female  - Nominal
Canada  UK  Switzerland
Gen.  P. Ann.  P. Gen.  P. Ann.  P. Gen.  P. Ann.  P.
Level  SPIA  87.2  91.1  100.0  107.4
Level  SPIA  87.7  91.3  100.7  107.5
+  10YG  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Escalating  SPIA  _  =
D. Female - Real
UK  Chile  Israel
Gen.  P.  Ann. P.  Gen. P,  Ann P.  Gen.  P.  Ann. P  Mandat.
Level  SPIA  76.0  80.5  70.6  78.3
Level  SPIA  76.6  80.3  70.9  77.9
+ 10YG
*  See  Tables  2 and  4 for notes  and  definitions
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Money's  Worth  Ratio (MWR) with Corporate  Rate - Age 75 (%)
A. Male - Nominal
Canada  UK  Switzerland
Gen. P. Ann. P.  Gen.  P.  Ann. P.  Gen.  P.  Ann. P.
Level  SPIA  85.1  98.4  82.3  90.7  83.3  107.2
Level  SPIA  88.3  95.1  89  92.5  92.4  106.3
+ 10YG
Escalating  SPIA  76.8  86.1
Joint  SPIA  ..  83.6  90.8  74.7  95.6
B. Male - Real
UK  Chile  Israel
. . Gen.  P.  Ann. P.  Gen. P.  Ann.  P.  Gen.  P.  Ann. P  Mandat.
Level  SPIA  73.1  81.8  81.6  89.0  75.7  90.1
Level  SPIA  85.9  88.6  82.1  87.6
+ 10YG  _  r  X  l  l_87.
Joint  SPIA  75.7  83.5  83.3  87.8
C. Female - Nominal
Canada  UK  Switzerland
Gen. P.  Ann. P.  Gen. P.  Ann.  P.  Gen.  P.  Ann. P.
Level  SPIA  88.5  97.7  83.8  90.3  91.7  105.4
Level  SPIA  90.4  96.2  88.3  92.2  96.4  105.2
+ 10YG  _
Escalating  SPIA  78.9  86.5
D. Female - Real
UK  Chile  Israel
_Gen.  P.  Ann. P.  Gen.  P.  Ann. P.  Gen. P.  Ann. P  Mandat.
Level  SPIA  75.7  82.8  80.9  90.7  68.7  I  88.6  l
Level  SPIA  84.4  89.2  76.9  86.9
+  10YG 
*  See Tables  2 and  4 for notes  and  definitions
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